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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES: THE
CASE O F REGULATORY FAILURE
David Cohen*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Compensation claims against provincial and federal governments are largely a product of the second half of the 20th century.
The initial surge of cases after the enactment of the federal Crown
Liability Act1 in 1953 - mirrored also in developments at the
provincial level - were typically "private" tort claims. Indeed a
significant percentage of claims against the federal government
continue to be nothing more than automobile accident, occupier
liability claims and lawsuits arising out of similar relatively minor
bureaucratic error^.^
Recently, however, as a result of both the imagination of
litigators and the growth of the regulatory state, claims against
governments have extended to claims for recovery of economic
losses related to the negligent enforcement of building
regulation^,^ the negligent failure to resolve labour disputes in the
~ negligent regulation of financial
federal civil ~ e r v i c e ,the
in~titutions,~
and the failure to enact regulations establishing oil
and gas royalties payable to Indian bands.6
This flurry of litigation has led some to claim that the courts are
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This is the revised
version of a paper presented at the Economic Negligence Symposium, sponsored by the
Canadian Business Law Journal and held at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Toronto, on April 19,1991. I would like to note the assistance of Paul Fairweather in the
preparation of this paper.
S.C. 1952-53,c. 30 -now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50.
See D. Cohen, "Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment of the State" (1990), 40
U.T.L.J. 213, at DD. 247-50.
3 See ~ a m l o o j k
(diiy)v. Nielson (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641, [I98412 S.C.R. 2.
See Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Canada (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 421, [I9771 1 F.C.
715,affd87D.L.R. (3d)511,[1979] 1 F.C. 39.
See Baird v. Canada (1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d) 1,48 N.R. 276 (F.C.A.).
6 See Alexander Indian Band No. I34 (Council) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs &
Northern Development), [I99112 F.C. 3,39 F.T.R. 142.
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becoming more active in their willingness to review regulatory
activities of government agencies. Between 1984 and 1990, the
popular literature and case reports were replete with suggestions
that the courts order governments to address losses associated
with public vaccination programme^,^ to compensate tobacco
farmers for losses associated with increases in levels of taxation
representing government policy to reduce s m ~ k i n g t, o~
compensate haemophiliacs who have tested HIV p o ~ i t i v e ,to
~
address the claims of persons who suffered birth defects after their
mothers ingested thalidomide,1° and to provide compensation to a
woman who, as one of a number of patients, received repeated
electroshock therapy at a Montreal psychiatric institute as part of a
federally funded programme.ll
Both the popular and legal rhetoric suggest an image of governments under attack in the courts. However, closer examination of
the facts of litigation, at least against the federal government,
suggests that perhaps here, as nowhere else in tort law, "the lines
have held".12 The 1990 Public Accounts of Canada lists all governmental expenditures by department for the fiscal year ending on
March 31, 1990. In that year, the expenditures of the federal
government totalled $131,945,022,000.13Excluding legal expenses
See RothweN v. Rues (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 280,2 O.R. (3d) 332 (C.A.), affg 54 D.L.R.
(4th) 193,66 O.R. (2d) 449, and supp. reasons at 59 D.L.R. (4th) 319,69 O.R. (2d) 62
(action against manufacturer, distributor and Crown dismissed for failure to demonstrate
sufficient causal connection between vaccine and injuries): see also, "Medical groups urge
program to compensate vaccine victims", The Globeand Mail, January2,1987, at p. A14;
"Taking on Ottawa: Action Groups Wait, Wonder", The Toronto Star, October 18,1990,
at p. 11.
8 See "Former tobacco farmers taking government to court", The Globe and Mail, Report
on Business, May 11,1990, at p. B5.
9"Taking on Ottawa: Action Groups Wait, Wonder", supra, footnote 7 at p. I t . The
claim, which is being pursued by the Canadian Haemophilia Society, alleges that
Canada's blood-screening system was not in place until 12 months after New Zealand's
and nine months after that of the United States.
'0 Ibid., at p. 11. The Thalidomide Victims Association of Canada is claiming $10 million
on behalf of the victims, alleging that the federal government shares liability with the
manufacturer because it licensed the use of the product in Canada.
l 1 "Woman stripped of memory seeks redress", The Globe and Mail, March 6,1990.
l 2 Jeremy Rabkin argues that, in the United States, claims against the federal government
rose much more slowly in the period from 1975-1986 than did general product liability
litigation. As well, his data suggests that "The federal government . . . continues to
prevail in the overwhelming majority of tort claims filed against it.": see J. Rabkin,
"Where the Lines Have Held: Tort Claims against the Federal Government", in New
Directions in Liability Law (1988), 37(1) Proc. Acad. Pol. Sc., at pp. 112-25, Walter
Olsen, ed.
l 3 This excludes some $487,263,000 in federal government loans, investments and
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as a cost element,14 the total amount of money paid out by the
government in respect of what might loosely be called "damage
claims" during the 1990 fiscal year totalled only $16,423,000; this
represented only .0001244 of the total budgetary expenditures.
This $16 million figure consists of settlements and damage claims
($14,524,350); ex gratia payments ($921,000);15 Federal Court
awards ($732,749);16 and nugatory payments ($246,000).17 In
other words, about 1/10,00Oth of the federal budget in 1990 was
paid out in compensation claims. This 1/10,00Oth of the federal
budgetary expenditures represented all settlements and
payments, including contract, property, traditional tort claims and
so on. Only a small proportion represented "economic loss"
claims -hardly a crisis by any standards. l8
What then has spawned the perception that governments are
being subjected to intolerable levels of legal liability? One explanation for the recent reports of litigation, as well as for many of the
cases decided in recent years, was the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Kamloops (City) v. Nielson,19which began the
advances: see Table 2, "General Summary Non-budgetary", Vol. 11, Public Accounts of
Canada, 1989-90,Part 1, Details of Expenditures and Revenues, at 1.8-1.9.
l 4 Legal expenses are reported by Department in Section 5 of the Public Accounts, as
Professional and Special Services: see Vol. 11, Public Accounts of Canada, 1989-90,Part
11, Additional Information and Analyses. In the 1989-90fiscal year, departmental expenditures for legal services totalled $42,249,666: see Vol. 11, Public Accounts of Canada,
1989-90, Part 11, Additional Information and Analyses, at 5.3. However, there is no
information as to whether this represents actual expenditures for legal services from
firms outside government, or an internal accounting technique representing an intergovernmental accounting of services to departments provided by the Department of
Justice. More importantly, there is no information as what percentage of this figure
represents litigation expenses, as compared to expenses incurred in policy development
and the provision of general legal advice.
This figure excludes a payment of $21,000 per person to individuals claiming compensation under the Japanese Redress Program (P.C. 1988-8912552) from the Ministry of
State (Multiculturalism and Citizenship) totalling $263,970,283: see Vol. 11, Public
Accounts of Canada, 1989-1990,Part 11, at 9.18-9.114.
l6 This includes $150,000 in Federal Court awards awarded on income tax appeals: see Vol.
11, Public Accountsof Canada, 1989-90,Part 11, Additional Information and Analyses, at
9.117-9.118.
l7 Formally, nugatory payments are awarded in respect of claims in which "no value or
service has been received, but for which a liability is recognized": see Vol. 11, Public
Accountsof Canada, 1989-90, Part 11, at 9.119.
ls One point which should be noted is that the damage claim figure excludes situations
where legislative programmes have been developed to respond to compensation claims
which might otherwise have been subject to litigation: see, for example, "Medical groups
urge program to compensate vaccine victims", supra, footnote 7; "Compensation
Pushed for Kids Harmed by Shots," The Vancouver Sun, November 21,1986; "Canada
Eyes Compensation Plan for Vaccine Injuries", The Medical Post, December 9,1986.
l9 Supra, footnote 3. Some aspects of the now famous "two-stage" approach to determining
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modern era of tort litigation against governments in Canada. The
recent cases before the Supreme Court have confirmed that
employment of the Anns doctrine continues to be the court's
preferred approach to government liability clairns.*O Indeed,
notwithstanding the criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada's
~
argue that the
decision in Just v. British C ~ l u r n b i a I, ~would
Supreme Court has simply continued the approach it took in 1984.
Kamloops v. Nielson did, however, dramatically transform the
approach which the judiciary would take from then on in
addressing government liability claims. First, it represented an
explicit confirmation of the two-stage Anns approach to determinations as to the existence of a legal duty of care. The first stage of
the test - foreseeability of risk of injury -would almost always
be met in government liability claims, given the planned and
complicated institutional character of much of modern
government activity.
Thus, the analysis of government liability claims has, from 1984
onwards, invariably involved the application of the second stage of
the Anns formula. This second stage requires explicit judicial
assessment of the policy considerations relevant to a decision to
expose the government to, or insulate it from, legal responsibility.
Kamloops has undoubtedly transformed the traditional judicial
search for abstract, highly conceptual "legal duties of care" into a
much more pragmatic assessment of the role of the judiciary in
relation to the exercise of bureaucratic power, and of the implications of imposing liability on regulatory programmes and on
private markets.
liability as expressed in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, 119781 A.C. 728
(H.L.), had earlier been adopted in several lower court rulings
- and in at least one
Supreme Court of Canada decision.
However, these decisions dealt with activities which had obvious private counterparts
and did not, at least in the same way as Kamloops, raise the spectre of governmental
liability for economic losses associated with regulatory failure: see Welbridge Holdings
Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg (Metropolitan Corp.) (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711
S.C.R. 957 (no liability for failure at the legislative or quasi-judicial level to take
reasonable care in following procedures for enacting by-law); Barratt v. North Vancouver
(District) (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418 (no liability for policy
decisions relating to road inspection); Malat v. Bjornson (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612,
[I9811 2 W.W.R. 67 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused D.L.R. loc. cit.
(liability for negligent operational decision involving failure to construct median barrier
after a decision to do so had been made).
mThe approach of the Supreme Court in its 1989 decision in Rothjield v. Manolakos
(1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 449, [I9891 2S.C.R. 1259, is virtually indistinguishable from that
in Kamloops v. Nielson, supra, footnote 3.
21 (1989), 64 D.L. R. (4th) 689, [I9891 2 S.C. R. 1228.
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Second, Kamloops has been interpreted as permitting recovery
for "pure" economic losses. Since much of what government does
is to redistribute wealth either purposefully, contingently or
inadvertently, the case represented an opportunity for rapid
judicial expansion of recovery for government-induced losses.
This recognition of legal responsibility for economic risks
associated with government action was coupled with the application of common law tort principles to a clear instance of "regulatory failure", in contrast to the more common use of tort law to
regulate bureaucrats by holding them liable for behaviour which
would be tortious if done by a private individual. Given that
governments are often engaged in regulatory activities which have
no obvious private analogue, Kamloops should be, and indeed
was, seen as the vehicle through which the courts could mediate
claims for a range of losses generated by less than competent
bureaucrats engaged in the myriad of activities designed to create
and distribute economic entitlements directly, and to regulate the
creation and distribution of wealth by private actors.22
Third, Kamloops was one of the first cases in Canada in which
the Supreme Court was explicit in stating the source of the
common law duty of care; the kinds of interests protected by the
courts through the application of the duty of care in tort; and the
class of persons who were entitled to claim compensation for their
losses as a result of the breach of that duty: these factors were all to
be identified through a close analysis of the legislative and
regulatory framework within which the bureaucracy was
operating. It is true that the court has rejected the concept of
"breach of statutory duty", and reaffirmed its commitment to the
idea that the tort liability of public authorities would continue to
be founded in a common law private duty of care. None the less,
reading Kamloops and virtually every case since 1984 confirms
that the legislative responsibility of the regulatory authority holds
the key to the existence and definition of its legal liability.
22 In this article, I focus my attention on tort claims which arise from regulatory failure in an

effort to capture the distinctive character of government action and the wav in which it
affects the -economic interests of private firms. Thus, I do not analyze recent cases
involving non-regulatory activity in which governments have been sued, as these cases
are invariably indistinguishable from private tort law cases: see Stuart v. Canada, [I98912
F.C. 3, (19881 6 W.W.R. 211 (application of Alberta Occupiers' Liability Act, R.S.A.
1980, c. 0-3, s. 5, to the federal government in respect of a claim for compensation for
personal injuries incurred as a result of a fall in a parking lot); Rmmussen v. Canada
(Ministryof Fisheries & Oceans) (19891 2 F.C. 651,24 F.T.R. 86 (claim for value of fish
unlawfully seized and sold by the federal government to a Crown corporation).
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Finally, Kamloops, like Anns, purported to collapse the
historical distinction between acts of commission and omission
and, at least for the purposes of governmental liability, assimilated
bureaucratic failure to act and active wrongdoing. As I argue later,
this distinction is required in the case of governments once one
accepts that the source of legal responsibility is the regulatory
programme which the bureaucracy is entrusted to implement.
Liability for failing to act, when applied to private individuals
carries with its enormous implications in terms of ideas about
causation and of liberal ideas of personal obligation - leaving
aside the pragmatic difficulty of defining the boundaries of legal
responsibility. Conversely, liability for failing to act, when applied
to public bureaucracies requires only that we identify the positive
social obligation articulated in the relevant legislative authority
pursuant to which the bureaucracy was operating.
Since Kamloops, the Supreme Court of Canada has had several
opportunities to reconsider this approach to government liability
with results which have not changed the judicial terrain to any
significant degree. In
Cory J., speaking for the court,
clearly rejected recent Commonwealth decisions which
themselves had retreated from Anns, and reaffirmed that the
Supreme Court would continue to employ the two-stage formula
which it had adopted from Anns some six years earlier in the
Kamloops case. While some might argue with Cory J. about where
we should draw the line between policy and operational decisions,
and while there is some language in the judgment which suggests
that even policy decisions might incorporate an element of judicial
review for reasonableness, virtually all of the judgment reflects
precisely the ideas which the Supreme Court earlier expressed in
Kamloops. 24
24

Supra, footnote 21.
What is very interesting is the resulting ambivalence of lower courts faced with the two
very different approaches - the so-called liberal or expansive approach taken in the
Supreme Court and the much more conservative and restrictive doctrine in the Commonwealth cases. The result is a series of very confusing judgments at the trial and appellate
levels, which will certainly lead to future Supreme Court of Canada decisions seeking to
clarify the issue: see, for example, Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp., [I9901 6 W.W.R.
536,108 A.R. 115 (Q.B.) (government agency not liable for negligence in assessing loan
application); Akhtar v. MacGillivray & Co., [I9911 2 W.W.R. 489,112 A.R. 242 (Q.B.)
(no liability in Securities Commission for alleged negligent assessment of corporate information). In both these cases, the courts seem to collapse the two lines of authority notwithstanding their apparent contradictory approaches. As I argue later, however, I
am not certain that much of this matters.
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11.

TWO VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF COURTS TO
GOVERNMENTS

From 1984 until today, we have witnessed both academic and
judicial consternation, if not admitted confusion, about how to
respond to claims in tort for recovery of economic losses
associated with maladministration, bureaucratic negligence and
regulatory failure. One important reason for this confusion is the
tension between two very different views which the courts seem to
have of their relationship with the modern bureaucratic state.
These contradictory views - at least at the Supreme Court of
Canada level - can best be illustrated by considering the
following two quotations from recent Supreme Court decisions. In
both, the court attempted to defend its thinking about governmental liability.
The first quotation is from a case considering special procedural
privileges which the federal government attempted to confer on
federal bureaucracies. In that case the Supreme Court of Canada
said that:25

. . . the Crown cannot be equated with an individual. The Crl wn represents
the State. It constitutes the means by which the federal aspect of our
Canadian society functions. It must represent the interests of all members of
Canadian society in court claims brought against the Crown in right of
Canada. The interests and obligations of the Crown are vastly different from
those of private litigants making claims against the federal government.
At virtually the same time, the court in Just v . British C0lurnbia,~6
through Mr. Justice Cory, writing for the majority, ruled that in
See Rudolph Wolff & Co. Ltd. v. Canada, [I9901 1S.C.R. 695,43 Admin. L.R. 1, at p. 8.
In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal government had breached fiduciary
obligations, had breached contracts and was liable in tort in respect of negotiations
involving the International Tin Council. The Crown brought a motion to have the action
dismissed from the Supreme Court of Ontario and was successful. The Supreme Court of
Canada held that s. 17(1) and (2) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd
Supp.), now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, and s. 7(1) of the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
C-38, now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, s. 15(1), which vested exclusive jurisdiction to consider
damage claims against the federal government, did not violate s. 15 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
26 Supra, footnote 21. This view was also adopted by a minority of the Supreme Court in
Tock v. St. John's Metropolitan Area Board (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 620, [I99012 S.C.R.
1181, where La Forest J., writing for himself and Chief Justice Dickson, would have
radically limited the ability of governmental bodies to exculpate themselves from liability
in nuisance, by treating the liability of the governmental agency as indistinguishablefrom
that of private individuals, and by dramatically limiting the defence of statutory
authority.
25
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general the duty of care in tort owed by a government agency is the
same as that owed by one private person to another. These two
contradictory ideas, I think, explain the tension between two
realities which the court -and most of us, it is fair to say -simply
cannot reconcile.
The first historical reality is that courts and judges embody the
institutional and human dimensions of the rule of law. Dicey said,
almost a century ago, that all public authorities should be suable in
common law courts and should be liable through the application of
the same common law principles as would a private i n d i ~ i d u a l . ~ ~
Abstractions from social context, combined with an overriding
fear of bureaucratic power, have left us with a powerful and often
unstated judicial reluctance to recognize the government, public
bureaucrats or public institutions in general in the law of torts; and
an equally pervasive paranoia about developing a "public tort
law" which would operate according to a different set of ideas and
values than does private tort law.
That is the philosophy underlying Just, and it is not an
unexpected outcome of Diceyian notions of the rule of law that the
current model of judicial "tort" review consists largely of the
application of modified private tort law concepts to governments.
This approach reflects either the rudimentary development of
public law - focusing as it has on process review -or perhaps a
simplistic allegiance to Diceyian notions of the rule of law. It is
generally accepted that Dicey was the strongest advocate of
personal bureaucratic liability administered by common law
courts and of the non-recognition of the "state" in the common
law legal system. These two concepts lie at the heart of this
component of the current model of government liability in tort.
The second reality which the judges must, and certainly do,
accept is that the government and public bureaucrats do not
respond to liability risks in the same fashion as do private firms;
that the allocation of legal liability to "the government" in fact
represents risk spreading to taxpayers; that public bureaucrats, as
individuals, participate in the delivery of public services and
benefits which have no private analogues; that government action
27 See

A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed.
(London, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1959). I make this point in more detail in D. Cohen,
"Thinking about the State: Law Reform and the Crown in Canada" (1986), 24 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 379, at pp. 388-92.
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may, to varying degrees and in complicated ways, represent the
expression of the democratic will to which the judiciary should
defer; that government responsibilities are established and
defined through a complex of legislative and regulatory enactments which charge public bureaucrats with responsibilities in
ways which private individuals and firms simply do not
experience; that governments may represent monopolistic deliverers of services, imposing risks to which the public has no alternative but to submit; and so on.
These two realities simply cannot be reconciled. Formal notions
of the rule of law embodied in our legal heritage tell us to treat
governments and similar public authorities as if they were private
firms. Almost everything else we know about modern bureaucratic governments -what they are empowered to do, how they
operate, their position in the modern state relative to courts and
judges - tells us that to do so is both foolish and indefensible
given what most of us are trying to achieve in tort law. Until we
choose to reject attempts to assimilate the government to the
position of private firms we will continue to read judgments which
cannot be understood as anything but manifestations of this
judicial schizophrenia. It is my view that recovery of economic
losses for regulatory failures must continue to be adjudicated -if
they remain in the court system at all - according to principles
which necessarily differ from those applied to resolve disputes
between private actors.
Ill. THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS

Since Kamloops, we have seen literally hundreds of cases
struggle with a doctrine which asks that 19th century ideas about
the role of the state in England be applied at the end of the 20th
century in Canada. If one accepts the approach in Kamloops, the
policy/operational distinction becomes the doctrinal tool which is
employed to draw the line between claims which are compensable
and those that are not. I have written about the variables which I
see operating under the umbrella of that doctrine, and little would
be gained by repeating them here.28 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court of Canada has had the opportunity to reconsider
28

See D. Cohen "The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem: Part 11"
(1983-84),8 C.B.L.J.410, at pp. 420-30.
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its position on Kamloops. While the judgments are confusing, it is
my sense that these cases reaffirm what is obviously a frustrated
and ultimately fruitless commitment to treat the government as if
it were a private firm and simultaneously to recognize the unique
political character, fiscal environment and social responsibility of
the modern Canadian state.
What is clear, then, is that the analysis of the liability of central
governments as well as of their subsidiary agencies will continue
necessarily to involve several issues which have no counterpart in
the analysis of the tort liability of private firms and individuals.
The courts will continue to focus on the legislative and regulatory
framework within which the bureaucracy operates to determine
several issues fundamental to a determination of legal liability;
they will continue to have to recognize the adjudicative responsibilities of many administrative agencies; the courts will have to
continue to struggle with the complex issues associated with the
identity of the bureaucrat/agency/government which is subject to
liability; and, finally, the courts will continue to be sensitive to the
very persuasive reasons for judicial deference to authorized
bureaucratic activity. Recent cases confirm that the Supreme
Court's half-hearted direction to equate the liability of public
authorities with that of private firms is being and, I believe, will
always be, distorted in a substantial majority of cases.
The first issue which is unique to tort litigation involving governments is the necessity for the court to investigate closely the
regulatory environment in which the relevant bureaucrats operate
in order to determine the kinds of interests which will be recognized in litigation, as well as the class of persons who will be able to
pursue compensation if those interests are not respected.
Government liability tort cases necessarily involve an assessment
of the regulatory programme pursuant to which bureaucrats
operate; where it is clear that the programme is designed to
protect the economic interests of private citizens, economic loss is
recoverable without serious debate.29 There is obviously no
private situation which generates this legislatively focused inquiry.
This is the point made by Madame Justice Wilson in Kamloops, where she addresses the
"floodgates" risk by arguing that economic loss is only recoverable if it was within the
purview of the statute as an interest which was protected by the relevant regulatory
programme: see Kamloops (City) v. Nielson, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 679-80 D.L.R. See
also, Bruce Feldthusen, "Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday
andTomorrow" (1991), 17 C.B.L.J. 356, at p. 362.
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Several recent decisions make this point unambiguously. In
Brewer Bros. v . Canada (Attorney General),3O several farmers had
extended credit to a grain elevator operator licensed by the
Canadian Grain Commission under the Canada Grain Act.31The
licensee went bankrupt and the farmers sued for, and successfully
recovered, $420,000 from the federal government to compensate
them for the economic losses incurred on the bankruptcy of the
elevator operator. The court held that its decision as to whether a
private law duty of care was owed by the government to the
farmers "required an analysis of the statutory underpinnings
which create the public duty" of the regulatory authority.32The
court justified its conclusion that a duty of care existed on the
ground that the "primary purpose of the Canada Grain Act . . .
was to protect the economic interests of the grain producers" .33
The same approach, with a radically different outcome, was
taken in Wirth v. Vancouver (City).34 That case involved a claim in
negligence brought by the plaintiff against the city for incorrectly
calculating the square footage of a building to be constructed on
property adjoining that of the plaintiff. A building was
constructed which would not have been permitted by the applicable zoning by-laws, and which allegedly reduced the value of the
plaintiffs property. The court interpreted the relevant zoning
legislation as not being directed at protecting the economic
interests of neighbouring owners of zoned property and clearly
rejected recovery of pure economic loss on the basis of mere
foreseeability of risk of inj~ry.3~
3 (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 71,31 F.T.R. 191(T.D.), vard80 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.A.).
31 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 7, s. 35, now R.S.C. 1985, c. G-10, s. 45(1). A statutory conditionof

licensing established under s. 36(l)(c), now s. 46(l)(c), was that the commission was
satisfied that the licensee was financially able to carry on the elevator operation, and had
given security sufficient to ensure that all of its contractual obligations to farmers could
be met. Section 38 of the Act empowered the commission to obtain additional security
where it had reason to believe and was of the opinion that the current security of the
licensee was insufficient.
32 Brewer v. Canada, supra, footnote 30, at p. 91 D.L.R.
33 Ibid., at pp. 96 and 98 D.L.R. An almost identical approach and result was adopted in a
New Zealand case, Steiller v. Porirua City Council, [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 84, in which the
court interpreted the applicable legislation as providing protection to home buyers in
respect of substandard construction materials. In that case, the court awarded damages
to a homeowner who had purchased a home which had been constructed with
substandard materials that had not been discovered on an inspection by the city.
34 (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 745, [I9901 6 W. W.R. 225 (B.C.C. A.).
35 Similarly, in Akhtar v. MacCillivray, supra, footnote 24, a case involving a claim against
the Alberta Securities Commission, the court held (at p. 543 W.W.R.) that the "powers
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In McGauley v. British C o l ~ r n b i aHuddart
,~~
J. was faced with a
claim by a large group of investors who had lost their savings when
a co-operative, which had been unlawfully acting as a financial
institution, went bankrupt. The plaintiffs claimed that the Superintendent of Co-operatives had been negligent in carrying out his
regulatory responsibilities under the provincial Cooperative
Association
The court denied that the government had any
duty of care to the depositors. After a close examination of the
relevant legislation, the court held that the purpose of the legislation was to further the co-operative activities of licensed co-operatives, and not to protect the economic interests of members of a
co-operative who mistakenly assumed that their directors' actions
were authorized by their corporate c o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~
Finally, in Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong K ~ n g , ~ ~
the plaintiff suffered substantial financial losses after depositing
funds in a registered institution which was subsequently liquidated. The Privy Council held that the legislation under which the
company was registered was39a

. . .designed to give added protection to the public against unscrupulous or
improvident managers of deposit-taking companies, but it cannot
reasonably be regarded . . . as having instituted such a far-reaching and
stringent system of supervision as to warrant a n assumption that all deposittaking companies were sound and fully credit-worthy.
. . . in the regulators to allow for the protection of the public at large, [were] not intended
to allow for a complementary, common law duty of care".
In a recent decision involving a claim against the Toronto police force arising out of the
alleged negligence of the police in failing to warn the plaintiff of the activities of a rapist,
the Ontario Court of Appeal similarly rejected foreseeability as sufficient to trigger a
duty of care, but only after the court closely analyzed sections of the Police Act to reach
the conclusion that the police were under a duty of care to preserve the peace, prevent
crime and apprehend offenders. In Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality)Board of
Commissionersof Police (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 396 at pp. 426-7,48 C.C.L.T. 105, the
court indicated that the police might owe a duty of care to a victim of a rapist given the
circumstances which indicated that the police knew the rapist was active in a confined
geographical area and was choosing victims with physical characteristics similar to those
of the plaintiff. On appeal (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580, 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.), the
same view was taken.
36 (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 217 (S.C.), appeal allowed pending further argument 56
B.C.L.R. (2d) l(C.A.).
3'R.S.B.C. 1979,~.66.
38 See also Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co. (1990), 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 291 (S.C.) This decision
employs the same analytical technique to deny governmental liability for economic losses
arising out of the failure of the relevant government agencies to adequately review
corporate prospectuses.
39 [I9881 A.C. 175, [1987]2AllE.R. 705.
3% Ibid., at p. 197 A.C.
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As there was no scheme (according to the interpretation of the
judges) to protect against financial loss, no duty of care was found.
The recent English decisions which have overruled Anns will
not significantly alter this aspect of the development of the legal
liability of governmental institutions. These decisions, taken as a
whole, emphatically reject the imposition of legal liability for
failure to implement positive regulatory responsibilities based on
mere foreseeability of risk of injury. On one view, this will
confront legal decision-makers with some serious conceptual
problems when faced with claims that public bureaucrats failed in
some way to deliver regulatory benefits which the public, or a
particular individual member of the public, expected to receive. In
all of the recent cases discussed above, the courts respond to this
issue by focusing their attention on the legislative and regulatory
framework within which the bureaucracy operates to determine
the kind of interests which ought to be recognized and the class of
persons intended to be protected. As the cases indicate, in
virtually all situations, an individual is claiming that the public
bureaucrat failed to deliver some service or benefit for which he or
she was responsible; and, in virtually all cases, the entitlement or
.~
regulatory activity or both has no private a n a l o g ~ e Claims
against governments almost invariably introduce issues of nonfeasance. In Kamloops, for all of its critics, the Supreme Court
recognized that where bureaucrats are sued for failing to deliver
regulatory benefits, the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance, whatever its merits in resolving and defining private
conflicts and relations, should have little appli~ability.~~
It is not at all clear that the recent English cases will change this
approach by very much. Judges, even if they adopt the recent
English decisions and reject the two-stage Kamloops test, cannot
avoid dealing with the intractable policy questions raised by
government liability claims. If they were to accept the approach in
these recent English cases, Canadian courts would be required to
Thus, in Funk v. Clapp (1986), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 229,35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 222 (C.A.), the
court was asked to determine whether the police owed a duty of care to a man who
committed suicide in a jail cell after he had been jailed without being deprived of his belt.
The court held that the police were under a duty of care to ensure that people in custody
were not able to injure themselves.
41 In Scotland, the issue of non-feasance and the liability of public authorities in light of
Anns was explicitly recognized in the case of vaccination liability claims in Banrhrone v.
Secretary of State for Scotland, [I9871 S.L.T. 34.
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determine whether a public authority is liable on the basis of a
vague "close proximity" standard or an even more abstruse "fair
and reasonable" test.42The House of Lords, in Yuen Kun Yeu v.
Attorney-General of Hong K ~ n g explicitly
,~~
restated the first
stage of Anns as encompassing not only foreseeability, but also
notions of a "necessary relationship", and went on to say that the
analysis of the policy reasons for not imposing liability would be
considered "only in a limited category of cases". Most recently, in
Murphy v. Brentwood District C ~ u n c i lthe
, ~ ~House of Lords in
several judgments acknowledged that it would not in the future
use the Anns approach. Instead, the courts will either require that
the imposition of a legal duty of care be "fair or reasonable", or
alternatively recognize a legal duty of care when there is a sufficiently close and proximate relationship between an individual
plaintiff and the regulator.
I am not sure that the change matters very much, either in terms
of the outcome of the cases or in the arguments to which the courts
will be sensitive. One concern might be that, by collapsing the
KamloopslAnns standard into one principle, we will no longer see
the explicit articulation and argument of the policy reasons for
either imposing or not imposing liability which has become the
hallmark of decisions involving government defendants during the
past decade. I do not share this concern. A reading of the cases
which purport to follow the recent English decisions demonstrates
virtually no change from the Kamloops approach. For example, in
deciding whether a duty of care existed in Murphy, the House of
Lords itself was forced to inquire into the objectives of the legislation to determine whether there was anything in the terms of the
legislation which would support the view that "the purpose of the
statute was to protect owners of buildings from economic loss".45
in Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd.,
[I9841 3 All E.R. 529, the House of Lords rejected the approach in Anns and held that a
municipal authority did not owe a duty of care to safeguard developers against economic
losses associated with negligent approval of construction plans, on the basis that it was
not "just and reasonable" that a duty of care exist. This approach has been adopted in
Canada in several decisions. In Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp., supra, footnote 24,
McDonald J. was faced with a claim that a firm suffered financial losses when its loan
application was improperly assessed by the defendant government agency. He denied
liability, holding that it would not be "just and reasonable" to impose a legal duty upon a
lender to use reasonable care in assessing the financial affairs of a loan applicant.
43 Supra, footnote 39.
44 [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414. See also, Department of Environment v. T. Bates & Son Ltd.,
119901 3 W.L.R. 457.
45 ~ u r p v.
h Brennvood
~
District Council, ibid., at p. 449. As I have discussed earlier, the
42 Thus,
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Tort claims against governmental authorities will also be
characterized by concerns that tort law is being used as a vehicle to
achieve judicial review of adjudicative decisions. A significant
number of government liability cases will continue to address the
potential liability of public authorities exercising judicial and
quasi-judicial functions which traditionally, and for a number of
very persuasive reasons, have been immunized from liabilit~.~6
While one thinks that this immunity applies only to classic judicial
activities, one gets a clear sense from reading the cases that a
significant segment of regulatory activity involves the exercise of
discretion in order to trigger judicial deference in subsequent tort
claims.
An example of the pervasiveness of this immunity is Yuen Kun
Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong itself.47That case involved
a group of depositors who attempted to recover money lost when
the financial institution in which their funds were invested failed.
The plaintiffs alleged that they relied on the government's registration of the bank as an indication that it was credit-worthy and
that the regulator responsible for such matters in Hong Kong
knew, or should have known, that the directors of the bank were
acting fraudulently. Lord Keith rejected the appellants' claim,
emphasizing that there was not a sufficient degree of proximity in
the relationship between the Commissioner and the appellant. In
so doing, he implicitly accepted the policy operational distinction
Supreme Court of Canada has recently reaffirmed its allegiance to the two-stage
approach it had adopted in Kamloops. However, there are some Canadian cases which
have clearly taken the English approach, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
direction. Nevertheless, these cases still require an analysis of the legislative framework
in which the bureaucracy operates in order to determine the class of person which might
benefit from a private right of action, as well as to articulate the kinds of interests
protected as a result of the institution of the regulatory program: see Wirth v. Vancouver
(City), supra, footnote 34, at pp. 748-9 D.L.R. (foreseeability risk of economic loss is not
sufficient to found a duty of care).
46 For example, in French v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 28, 9
O.R. (2d) 473, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the investigative functions of the
defendant were quasi-judicial in nature and thus did not give rise to liability in tort absent
malice. The Supreme Court of Canada was faced with this issue in Nelles v. Ontario
(1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 609, [I9891 2 S.C.R. 170, in which the court held that prosecutorial immunity for malicious prosecutorial decisions was contrary to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, there are remarks in the judgment which
suggest that historical immunities for "professional negligence" and related "errors of
judgment" by parties exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions may still be
respected by the court: ibid., at p. 644,per Lamer J. See also, Birchard v. Alberta (Securities Commission) (1988),42D.L.R. (4th)300at pp. 310-11, [I9871 6 W.W.R. 536.
47 Supra, footnote 39.
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by alluding to the quasi-judicial nature of the Commissioner's
decisions: "it might be a very delicate choice whether the best
course was to deregister a company forthwith or to allow it to
continue in business with some hope that . . . its financial position
would improve".48
The third aspect of government liability claims which has no
private analogue is the intractable problem concerning the
identity of the institutions and individuals who are the appropriate
subjects of litigation. The problem has several sources. The first is
the continued requirement, present in most Crown liability legislation, that the plaintiff demonstrate that an individual bureaucrat
has committed a common law tort which has caused the losses
sustained by the plaintiff -only then can the government be held
~ ~ issue is
vicariously liable under the relevant l e g i ~ l a t i o n .The
complicated by the fact that many government agencies are not
legal entities suable in tort, meaning that only the individual
bureaucrat is subject to legal liability for which the Crown is vicariously liable.50As well, it is becoming increasingly common to find
that the relevant legislation insulates individual public employees
from liability - either absolutely, or if they are acting in good
faith.51Courts have addressed, and will continue to address, both
the constitutionality of such statutory immunities and, more
problematically, will have to consider whether personal immunity
will necessarily result in institutional immunity for the government
itself .52
48 Ibid., at

p. 195 A.C.

49 See, for example, the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, s. 3(a).
50 Both these situations were presented in Air India Flight 182 Disaster Claimants

v. Air
India (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 317,62 O.R. (2d) 130, in which Holland J. dismissed claims
against the federal Solicitor-General and Minister of Transport since the court could not
recognize claims against persons in so far as they were being sued in their capacity as
government officers. Similarly, the court dismissed claims against the Department of
Transport and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service since they were not suable
entities.
51 See, for example, the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 25, which exempts police
officers from liability if they act on "reasonable grounds"; and the Elevator and Fixed
Conveyances Act, R.S.A. 1980,c. E-7, s. 9, which provides that inspectors are not liable
for injury, loss or damage when acting pursuant to the Act.
52 In G. ( A . ) v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Service) (1989), 61
D.L.R. (4th) 136, [I9901 1W.W.R. 61, supp. reasons at63 D.L.R. (4th)606n, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal recognized the difficulty of applying s. 23 of the Family and
Child Service Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 11, which immunized individual social workers from
liability for decisions taken in good faith, both in terms of its constitutionality and in
respect of the implications for the vicarious liability of the government: ibid., at p. 153.
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Finally, and most importantly, courts may be expected to
continue, whether or not the Supreme Court shifts from its
position in Just and Kamloops, to recognize the broad range of
justifications for judicial deference to bureaucratic discretion. A
substantial majority of very significant regulatory decisions are
motivated by economic, social, and political factors. They
represent public choices which mediate and reflect the conflicting
interests and claims of large numbers of the public who stand to
benefit or lose as a result of the exercise of regulatory power. For a
variety of reasons - including institutional competence, respect
for the exercise of democratic power, the acknowledgement of
internal bureaucratic and external political accountability
mechanism^,^^ and the unavailability of standards against which to
assess bureaucratic decisions - government liability claims will
necessarily generate decisions which deny legal liability for
reasons unique to government.
Again, I do not believe that the recent English decisions, were
they to be adopted in Canada, would generate any substantial
modification in the approach which Canadian courts will take in
responding to these issues. Any discussion of "proximity" or "the
justness and reasonableness of imposing duties of care" - if
judges do anything more than state their conclusions on the
existence of a duty of care - requires courts to explain their
concern with judicial deference to bureaucratic expertise,
resource allocation decisions, and similar "policy" factors.54In
Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp. ,55McDonald J. purported to
apply the recent English decisions, holding that it was not just and
Similarly, in Gutek v. Sunshine Village Corp. (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 406,103 A.R. 195,
the court was faced with a section of the provincial statute regulating elevator operations
which immunized individual bureaucrats from liability, and a section of the Alberta
Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S. A. 1980, c. P-18, s. 5(c), which provides that
any immunity that applies to employees also applies to the Crown.
53 See D. Cohen, supra, footnote 28.
s4 Perhaps the best example of this is in Hill Estate v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,
[I9881 2 All E.R. 238, a case involving an unsuccessful claim of negligence against the
defendant police force for failing to apprehend Peter Sutcliffe -the Yorkshire "Ripper"
-before he killed Suzanne Hill. The House of Lords held that the police did not owe a
duty of care to the victim and that foreseeability of risk of harm was not enough to trigger
legal responsibility. The court went on at length to describe its views regarding the ability
of the courts to assess police practices, their concern with distorting police investigative
discretion, the diversion of police resources to the defence of legal suits and away from
law enforcement activities,and so on.
S5 Supra, footnote 24.
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reasonable that a government agency would be responsible for
losses suffered by a firm whose loan application was improperly
assessed. His reasons, however, are indistinguishable from those
which one might find in a decision applying Kamloops, one which
focuses on the impact on the lender's cost of lending, on the
impact on insurance requirements if the lender would be held
liable, on the impact of liability on other borrowers and the taxpaying public and so on.56In fact, he states explicitly that "it would
be desirable to articulate the grounds upon which, as a matter of
policy, it is or is not 'just and reasonable' to develop a new
category [of negligen~e]".~~
Of course, the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet rejected
the approach it developed in Kamloops. And as these recent cases
suggest, even if it decided to reject Anns, I do not believe that
much will change. For all of the reasons developed above, the
courts will continue to address government liability claims using
concepts and principles which have no counterpart in claims
against private citizens and firms.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY -MORE OF THE
PAST?

Given these cases, and the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of its position in Kamloops, it seems to me that governments will continue to enjoy a broad immunity in respect of the
vast majority of regulatory decisions which produce and allocate
economic risks in the private sector. There are several reasons for
the original reluctance of the courts to extend liability to governmental bodies in respect of regulatory action which generates
economic risks, and for the continuation of this position in the
recent cases discussed above.
56 Another decision which purports to adopt the Kamloops

two-stage approach, but in fact
seems to integrate it with the more restrictive approach in Yuen and related cases, is a
recent decision of the Alberta Supreme Court: Akhtar v. MacCillivray, [I99112 W.W.R.
489,112A.R. 242 (Q.B.).In that case, the court held that mere foreseeability of risk of
injury to the investing public was insufficient to trigger a legal duty of care, and that a
"close and direct" relationship between the regulator and individual plaintiff would be
required. Here, as in Longchamps, the explanation for the decision was, as it must
always be, expressed in policy terms, in particular, the concerns of the regulators with the
investments of other individuals, and the degree and extent of control exercised by the
regulator under the Alberta Securities Act, R.S.A. 1980,c. S-6, repealed and replaced
by s. 199,Securities Act, 1981,S.A. 1981,c. S-6.1.
57 Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp., [I99016 W.W.R. 536 at p. 549,108A.R. 115 (Q.B.).
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First, for the past 30 years, the one overriding concern has been,
and continues to be, the issue of whether the plaintiff was in an
"individualized" relationship with some particular bureaucrat.
This question has concerned the court both in assessing whether a
particular bureaucratic decision is a "policy or operational
decision" and in deciding whether, to use the doctrine enunciated
in the recent English decisions, there is a relationship of sufficient
proximity that it would be "just and reasonable" to impose a duty
of care.
This requirement of an individualized relationship first appears
in Cleveland-Cliffs Steamships Co. v. The Queen,58decided soon
after the enactment of the federal Crown Liability Act;59it was
certainly present in Kamloops itself;60and it reappears in cases
like Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong,'jl where
the court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs claim, which was based
on "institutional" rather than individualized reliance.62We see it
as well in cases like Birchard v. Alberta (Securities Cornmissi~n),~~
where the court is explicit in its reluctance to impose liability on
regulatory agencies absent evidence of a particular decision or
representation directed at a particular plaintiff who subsequently
suffers a loss.
"Institutional reliance" as the basis for imposing liability has
been emphatically rejected by every court which has been asked to
adopt it.@ Instead, the courts seem to require actual reliance by
(1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at pp. 679-80, [I9571S.C.R. 810.
Most of the provincial Crown liability legislation, like s. 3 of the federal Act, reinforce
this approach by limiting governmental liability to vicarious liability for the common law
torts of individual bureaucrats. Thus, in most cases, the necessary focus of litigation is not
on institutional action and bureaucratic programmes, but rather on individual action and
common law tort liability of individuals.
60 The absence of this individualized relationship is perhaps what has caused much of the
discussion around the Just decision. What is apparent, however, in cases like Just, is that
this individualization of responsibility, which is most often found in judicial consideration of regulatory activity generating economic risks, will not be a prerequisite to
liability in cases which involve risks of personal injury. That distinction is an extremely
important one, which appears to have been ignored in most analyses of government
liability in Canada.
61 [I9881 A.C. 175, [I9871 2 All E.R. 705 (P.C.).
62 Ibid., at p. 189 A.C. In that case it was clear that the House of Lords was rejecting any
argument that depositors' generalized reliance on the existence of regulatory functions
exercised by the Colony's Commissioner of Deposit-taking Companies would justify the
impositionof a duty of care in tort.
63 Supra, at footnote 46. In that case, the court held that neither the Alberta Securities
Commission nor the Law Society of Alberta owed a duty of care to individual creditors of
a defunct company, on the ground that the plaintiff did not actually rely on any particular
representation of fiscal status by either party.
64 In McGauley v. British Columbia (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 217 at p. 234 (S.C.), Huddart
58
59
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the plaintiff on the specific low-level bureaucratic decision or
or at least knowledge of the identity of the potential
plaintiff as a member of a limited, defined class of potential
victims.66
J. held that reliance on statutory duties of auditors would not give rise to liability absent a
demonstration of actual reliance by the investors. In Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co.
(1990), 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 291 at p. 307 (S.C.), Boyd J. rejected a claim of liability based
on "indirect reliance or reliance on the regulatory process or reliance upon the statutory
duties set out in the securities legislation".
Another example of this approach is the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
in Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) v. Aza Avramovitch Associates Ltd. (1985), 11
D.L.R. (4th) 588, 62 N.S.R. (213) 181. In that case, an architect sued the province in
negligence for the Department of Health's inspection and approval of the location and
design of a defective sewage system. At trial, 58 N.S.R. (2d) 267 sub nom. Nova Scotia
Home for Coloured Children v. Aza Abramovitch Associates Ltd., the architect
succeeded against the province on the ground that the Board of Health "knew or ought to
have known [the approval] would be relied upon by people . . .": quoted, ibid., at p. 596
D.L.R. An appeal by the province was allowed as the judge found that the architect did
not rely on either the permit or the officials' opinion. In fact, there was evidence that the
architect knew nothing about the board's activities. The court went on to say, however,
that "if [one] had relied on that certificate . . . the inspectors would have been clearly
liable for negligence under the well-known doctrine of Hedley Byrne . . .": ibid., at p. 607
D.L.R.
65 Thus, the negligent zoning in Wirth v. Vancouver (City), supra, footnote 34, was held not
to give rise to liability since there was no reliance by the plaintiff on the inaccurate calculation of the square footage of a building on property adjoining that of the plaintiff. And
in Brewer Bros. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 71,31 F.T. R. 191
(T.D.), vard 80 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.A.), the court, while it found a duty of care on the
basis of its interpretation of the purpose of the Canada Grain Act, also found actual
reliance by the farmers. In the court's opinion the farmers were protected in part,
because the Grain Commission had issued a license which indicated that a sufficient bond
had been posted by the company, and in part because the court believed that "the plaintiffs' relied on the bond to protect them in the case of. . . default": ibid., at p. 99 D.L.R.
Similarly, in Hendrick v. DeMarsh (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 713, 45 O.R. (2d) 463
(H.C.J.), affd 26 D.L.R. (4th) 130,54 O.R. (2d) 185 (C.A.), a plaintiff (hostel owner)
sued the Ontario Ministry of Correctional Services for not informing them of a prisonerguest's inclination to set fires. The action was unsuccessful because of an expired
limitation period, but the judge went on to write that, if this had not been the case, the
plaintiff could succeed against the ministry: "[the parole officer's] affirmative answer to
the question whether DeMarsh was reliable implied that there was no peculiar risk
involved in accepting DeMarsh": ibid., at p. 732 D.L.R. Outside of the statutory bar the
ministry would have been liable for the probation officer's negligent misrepresentation to
the plaintiff.
@ See Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Board of Commissioners, supra,
footnote 35, at pp. 426-7 D.L.R. On appeal, (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580 at p. 584, 74
O.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.), the court held that foreseeability of risk of harm would be insufficient to trigger liability, but continued that the plaintiffs claim could proceed assuming
that she was part of a known and distinct group of potential victims. Similarly, in Air
India Flight 182 Disaster Claimants v. Air India, supra, footnote 50, the court suggested
that, while the federal government, through the Department of Transport and the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, did not owe a duty of care to the entire flying
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A second and perhaps more important explanation for judicial
conservatism in addressing economic negligence is the realization
that in a significant subset of cases, in particular in cases of governmental licensing and inspection activities, the imposition of
liability on the government might distort otherwise efficient
private-market mechanisms which are available to deal with the
relevant risk. That is, private tort liability risks represent an
economic signal to private firms; such risks provide an incentive to
make cost-justified investments in accident reduction, and would
otherwise be represented in pricing decisions in private market
transactions. The incentive effects of tort law, and the reduced
demand in the relevant market due to the risk-induced increase in
price, would be seriously attenuated if regulatory authorities were
to bear fiscal responsibility for losses associated with inadequate
market goods or services.(j7 It is this concern which logically
explains the decisions in cases like Yuen(j8 and Murphy(j9 and
Governors of Peabody Donation Fund.70To find a regulator liable
in cases where the regulatory activity involves inspection and
public, they might owe a duty of care to those identified persons flying on a particular
flight.
67 Thus, for example, in the case of potential liability for losses associated with adverse
reactions to vaccines, there is evidence in the United States that in 1987 at least one
company raised the per dose cost of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine from $4.29
(U.S.) to $11.40 (U.S.) as a result of the establishment of a self-insurance mechanism to
respond to product liability risks associated with the vaccine. Similarly, Connaught
Laboratories announced an increase of $3 per dose to cover the cost of self-insurance:see
"Medical groups urge program to compensate vaccine victims", supra, footnote 7. To the
extent that product liability risks are shifted from the private sector to public revenues,
the incentive effects of legal liability risks and the impact of price increases on demand
will be attenuated.
Of course, the issue is more complicated than that presented above. If the delivery of
the good or service is mandated by legislation, then the decrease in demand associated
with price increases will be substantially less than would be the case if the market were
operating more freely. As well, it is possible for the government, which faces contingent
liability risks, to shift those risks to the relevant firms through a licensing system, thus
replicating the market impact of direct firm liability. Whether we do this or not depends
not only on our interest in incentive effects, but also on our sense of equal treatment and
access to the relevant service or good.
Supra, footnote 61.
69 Supra, footnote 44. In that decision, Lord Mackay as well as Lord Bridge noted the
obvious link between the imposition of legal liability on regulatory authorities and the
tort liability of private enterprise: ibid., at pp. 430 and 439.
70 [I9841 3 All E.R. 529. The Privy Council in that case noted explicitly both their concern
that governmental liability might "safeguard building developers against economic loss
resulting from their failure to comply with approved plans", and the equally relevant
concern that governmental liability might insulate homeowners who failed to comply
with regulatory requirements: ibid., at pp. 534-5.
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licensing of private firms and market activities would immunize
such firms from at least some substantial portion of the economic
losses which their private action generates.
Perhaps the clearest example of this concern is a recent decision
of the Alberta Supreme Court, Gutek v. Sunshine Village C ~ r p . ~ l
That case was initiated by a plaintiff who sued SVC for recovery of
personal injury damages suffered when she fell from a chair lift.
SVC joined the Alberta government, alleging that it was negligent
in its failure to inspect the lift facilities, and in its subsequent
licensing of SVC to operate the ski lift. The court held that the
relevant legislation might impose on the government a duty of care
to members of the public in respect of personal safety risks.
However, the court held that no duty of care was owed by the
government to Sunshine and that the purpose of the legislation
was "not to hold safe from liability the designer, manufacturer,
installer or owner of ski lifts".72
A third explanation for the acceptance of a substantial sphere of
immunity around government action is that judges are becoming
increasingly sensitive to the unique environment in which public
bureaucrats operate -sensitive, that is, to the bureaucratic incentives which are not commonly found in the case of private firms.
One finds judges finally acknowledging that public bureaucracies
and public bureaucrats are unlikely to be deterred by the
economic risks represented by potentially adverse legal
decisions.73Public bureaucracies are not constrained by the kinds
of markets in which private corporations must survive. And one
finds increasing evidence that public institutions will formally or
informally insulate their civil servants from personal responsibility
for civil wrongs committed in the course of fulfilling their
Simultaneously, judges are acknowlregulatory resp~nsibilities.~~
-

71 Supra, footnote 52.
72 What thecourt apparently ignores is that

the distortion of private markets will occur both
where the government implicitly insures the "supplier" of a particular good or service
directly by sharing liability to a injured consumer, and where the government implicitly
insures the supplier through the imposition of direct tort liability to the consumer. In
both cases, the supplier's expected accident exposure is reduced in precisely the same
amount.
73 Thus, in Hill Estate v. Chief Constable, supra, footnote 54, the House of Lords argued
that imposing liability on the police would not appreciably reinforce the general sense of
public duty which motivates police forces: see D. Cohen, supra, footnote 2.
74 There are innumerable examples of legislative immunities applicable to specific bureaucracies or bureaucrats. There is no evidence that the courts are interpreting these provisions narrowly: see G. ( A , ) v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Child & Family
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edging that bureaucrats are likely to respond to the expectations
generated in and by the internal "bureaucratic culture" of which
they are an integral part, and may be over-deterred by threats of
legal liability.75For both these reasons, legal liability risks simply
cannot be expected to generate the same kind of deterrent or
regulatory responses that are assumed to occur in private firms.
Fourth, judges are increasingly recognizing the loss-spreading
and insurance implications of extending liability in tort for
economic risks against public institutions. The conclusion that
judges seem to be reaching is that members of the tax-paying
public would not be willing to pay an implicit insurance premium
(hidden in their taxes) for protection against many of the
economic risks for which individual plaintiffs are seeking
recovery.76 In Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp. ,77liability for
economic losses was denied because of judicial concerns about the
impact of legal liability risks on the lender's cost of lending, the
impact on insurance requirements if the lender were held liable,
and the impact of liability on the tax-paying public.
These views should be contrasted with the remarks of La Forest
J. in Rothfield v. M a n ~ l a k o s a, ~case
~ that involved municipal
liability and defective construction. La Forest J. first acknowledged that the inspection and supervision of construction sites
increases expenses for everyone involved in the enterprise; he
then noted that, in his view, most of us would justify the increased
expense as an investment, given that faulty construction creates
health and safety risks. These divergent views on public attitudes
towards various kinds of risk cannot be answered except by
empirical studies which, not surprisingly, are absent from both
judgments.
Service), supra, footnote 52 (good faith immunity under the Family Child and Service
Act required only that the social worker honestly believe that a child was in danger).
75 See Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General, supra, footnote 39, at p. 198 A.C., where the
Privy Council suggested that the regulators' judgement might be seriously inhibited by
the prospect of legal liability risks, and that bureaucratic effectiveness might be adversely
affected by defensive strategies adopted by regulators in an effort to avoid o r reduce
contingent liability in tort.
76 Thus, in the trial decision in Wirth v. Vancouver (City), (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 745 at p.
748, [I9901 6 W.W.R. 225 (B.C.C.A.), the judge refused to impose liability for economic
losses associated with negligent zoning approval in part on the ground that "owners and
tenants would have to pay if such a duty of care exists . . . and I do not see why residents
should pay for the kind of economic loss which occurred here".
77 Supra, footnote 57.
78 (1989),63 D.L.R. (4th)449, [I9891 2S.C.R. 1259.
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Finally, even as they say that they will not review "policy"
decisions and will treat the government like a private firm when it
acts "operationally", the courts are clearly doing something quite
different. In the case of "operational" decisions, they are
acknowledging that the statutory framework in which the
bureaucracy operate^,'^ budgetary issues, and the conflicting
demands placed on public resources and personnel will significantly affect the standard of care expected of public agencies and
public bureaucrat^.^^ As well, at least some courts are recognizing
that the pressing public need to permit bureaucrats to act quickly
and without fear of liability will, in particular situations - for
example in the case of child apprehension legislation - justify
judicial deference to bureaucratic choices which might not be the
case if a private firm, motivated by profit, were the defendant.81
V.

CONCLUSION

Regulatory failure and the consequent liability of public
officials to claims pursued through the avenue of private tort law
has attracted a great deal of interest and much comment and
debate about the rhetoric of judicial intervention. The quantity
and the level of discussion in this country regarding the perceived
benefits of adopting or ignoring the recent decision of the House
of Lords in Murphy (and, thereby, either completely rejecting or
once again affirming the AnnslKamloops approach) is astonishing
given the substantive outcomes of the decisions in these cases. It
79 See Fletcher

v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co. (1991), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 636 at pp. 655-6,
[I9901 3 S.C.R. 191, where, in assessing the liability in negligence of a provincial
automobile insurance company established by statute, the Supreme Court of Canada
said that the standard of care expected of the public insurer would be different and lower
than that of a private insurer in light of the institutional setting in which the public
insurer's agents operated, and in view of a statutory exemption from a licensing
requirement.
NIn Just v. British Columbia (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689, [I9891 2 S.C.R. 1228, Cory J.
said that the standard of care expected of the provincial rock scaling crews engaged in
"operational" inspections would have to be assessed in light of the fiscal constraints faced
by the Department and of competing demands for public resources.
81 For example, in G. ( A , )v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Service),
supra, footnote 52, the B.C. Court of Appeal took a very relaxed view of the standard of
care expected of social agency workers who apprehended a child they believed to be in
danger of sexual abuse by a family member. In a companion case, involving the failure to
apprehend a child who was a victim of sexual abuse, the court refused to review a trial
decision which found that the social worker was not negligent even though she failed to
abide by the policy set down by the Superintendent of Family and Child Service: see
M. (M.) v . K. (K.) (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 392 at p. 405,38 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273.
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would not, in fact, be unreasonable to characterize the entire issue
as something of a "tempest in a teapot". The "teapot" metaphor is
particularly apt given the foregoing discussion of the irrelevant
nature of the results of the debate as to whether Kamloops or
Murphy ought to be applied; the results will remain the same in
either event. Even those commentators arguing in favour of the
retention of the Karnloops doctrine have recognized the essential
similarity in result regardless of the test applied. The concern is
not with the articulation of the rule as much as it is with the
reactionary rhetoric in the cases.82
Given such a state of affairs, and if tort law is the appropriate
vehicle to use in addressing regulatory failure, it is clear that the
major difficulty to be faced in this area of the law does not arise
from a debate about the precise linguistic formulation of the rule
to be applied. The real problem is inherent in the lack of the
judicial will to establish a clearly defined model through which to
address the responsibility of the modern state towards those
citizens injured through the mismanagement of its regulatory
activities. The current doctrinal debate over the primacy of
"proximity" or "foreseeability" as the formal test of the existence
of a duty of care is only relevant to the extent that it recognizes
that the legal liability of governments cannot be formulated on the
same basis as that of a private firm or individual.
Close examination of the judgments on government liability
invariably indicates that the state's duty stems from the legislative
or regulatory scheme which imparts both the proximity and the
foreseeability which finally becomes the issue in the Kamloops
versus Murphy debate. This is a completely different argument
than the test of "who in law is my neighbour?" as framed by Lord
Atkin in M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. S t e v e n s ~ n The
. ~ ~ modern
Earl A. Cherniak and Kirk F. Stevens argue in "Two Steps Forward or One Step Back?
Anns at the Crossroads in Canada" supra, p. 165, that AnnslKamloops should remain the
test of choice in Canada. They do this, in part, by demonstrating that the result in Caparo
Industries PIC v . Dickman, [I9901 1 All E.R. 568, which was decided some six months
prior to Murphy but clearly heralded the demise of Anns by determining that
"proximity" would be the touchstone of liability in England, would have been the same
had Anns been applied. They are concerned, as is Feldthusen, that some of the language
in Murphy is "reactionary to the point [that it threatens] to overturn or retard many
modern developments in products liability and public authority law": see Feldthusen,
supra, footnote 29, at p. 369.
s3 [I9321 A.C. 562 at p. 580. O n one view, Lord Atkin was attempting to ensure that such a
duty might be found where the parties "created" a relationship by their actions in
relation to one another. The duty of care under which the state might be said to labour is
created, at least in part, by bureaucratic policy, regulation and legislation.
82
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Canadian state is, after all, far more the unique functionary
defined by the Supreme Court in Rudolph Wolff & Co., Ltd. v.
Canada,84 than it is in any way analogous to one's next-door
neighbour or to a commercial enterprise, regardless of size and
scope.
There are two further points which must be made in conclusion.
The first, which I made at the outset, is that, notwithstanding the
tremendous amount of energy expended in debating and
commenting upon this particular area of law, the reality seems to
be that at least some governments are minimally affected by its
application. As mentioned earlier, both the legal and popular
rhetoric suggest an image of governments under attack in the
courts. The data we have on the legal liability of the federal
government suggests precisely the opposite.
The second point is that the entire argument might be better
framed in a completely different way. The latter half of the 20th
century brought with it a dramatic expansion of the role of the
modern welfarelregulatory state in Canada. The expansion took
place both in tort law (product liability and medical malpractice
being the best-known examples), and in government (for
example, in the expansion of Crown corporations involved
directly in market activities, and in the development of a range of
licensing and public insurance regimes to monitor, control and
spread private market risks). The expansion of the Canadian state
reflected two things. One was that the public good might not
always be achieved through traditional market vehicles; market
failure should be addressed, first, by shifting losses through tort
law and, more dramatically, by regulating the activity through
centralized licensing and monitoring mechanisms. The second was
that the growth of the modern Canadian state acknowledged the
value of social insurance for a broad range of individual risks
which, while they might be insured privately, could be more
efficiently and equitably spread through loss-shifting mechanisms
triggered by contingent tort liability or by public regulatory and
insurance regimes.
As we reach the end of the century, this naive vision and
aspiration for a better world, through more and more regulatory
action by an increasingly centralized government, with an
expanded private tort law serving as the ultimate arbiter of
g4

[I99011 S.C.R. 695,43 Admin. L.R. 1.
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fairness and competence, has few supporters. Like market failure,
"government failure" has become all too common. Yet it is not
clear what we should do once we admit this. To ask that we return
to the "pure" market is to aspire to the economic, social and
political conditions of the 19th century. It also begs the question: is
tort law a fitting response to governmental failure under these or
any circumstances? I would argue that it is not.
One response to government failure is private tort law. As we
have seen since the middle of this century, tort law is perhaps an
appropriate vehicle to respond to the same kinds of accident-generating activities which first justified its application to private
actors and institutions. However, we have also seen that tort law
has not, and likely cannot, be effectively employed by the
judiciary to respond to government failure at anything more than
the most "micro" level of bureaucratic action. And yet, all of the
decisions which reflect judicial defence to public institutions,
regardless of the policy and doctrinal grounds for governmental
immunity, present serious problems to anyone concerned with
creating institutions which foster effective and accountable
government. If government fails, and the legal system does not
respond, what
The picture I have painted of the ways in which the legal system
has and, in my view, will continue to respond to economic negligence should be understood as an admission that an enormous
range of regulatory activity currently occurs without effective
compensatory or deterrent mechanisms in place to respond to
maladministration. To say that the legal system is an inappropriate
vehicle to address these claims is not to say that they should be
ignored. And yet, at the end of the day, that is precisely what tort
law does. I leave for another time any suggestions as to other,
more appropriate mechanisms with which society might respond.

85

TO say that the traditional electoral process is the vehicle through which to address
governmental failure is facile. We are talking not about free trade, sales tax legislation,
constitution-making, or national defence initiatives in foreign countries. Rather we are
dealing with serious losses generated by maladminstration across the bureaucracy in
ways which are invisible except to the particular victims of bureaucratic incompetence.
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